G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Petitioner Herald Dacasin, American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, Filipino, were married in Manila. They have one daughter, Stephanie. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois against petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie. On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie. In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the RTC to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie. The trial court sustained respondent’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody. The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together. However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity. Van Dorn v. Romillo has settled that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. The case was remanded for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
FACTS:
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes. On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order “relinquishing” jurisdiction to Philippine courts. In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree. The trial court sustained respondent’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike in the case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his nationality. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child – NO
RULING AND DOCTRINE:
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody. The trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdiction . . . for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution.” Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the “various provisions” of the divorce decree but of the postdivorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-called “retained jurisdiction.” The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is contrary to law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together. However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of Article 213.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity — not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse — to support the Agreement’s enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad.
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit, the logical end to its lack of cause of action, we remand the case for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.