G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen. Petitioner — a Filipina — and respondent Rederick Recio were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. She claimed that she learned of respondent’s marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997. While the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage had[d] irretrievably broken down.” The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul. The Supreme Court ruled that respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree — a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, the Supreme Court found no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter. Neither can the Supreme Court grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy for it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, the Supreme Court remanded this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which shows the respondent’s legal capacity to marry the petitioner.
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a “Certificate of Australian Citizenship” issued by the Australian government. Petitioner — a Filipina — and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.” Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy — respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent’s marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997. On July 7, 1998 — or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending — respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.”
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent’s alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage can be nullified on the ground of bigamy since the divorce of respondent’s first marriage was not proven – REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT
RULING AND DOCTRINE:
(1) Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven – NO
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that “aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.” Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
(2) Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.
In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree — a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner.
Neither can we grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner.