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San Luis vs. San Luis

G.R. No. 133743 & G.R. No. 134029, February 6, 2007

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
Felicismo San Luis married three times. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later after her death, he married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce. Subsequently, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis; they had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death. Respondent filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Makati but Motions to Dismiss were filed by the children of Felicismo in his first marriage. They contend that the venue was improperly laid since Felicismo’s residence was Sta. Cruz, Laguna and that the marriage between Felicismo and respondent was void-bigamous. They insist that Article 26 (2) of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect as it would affect their vested rights. The trial court ruled in their favor but the appellate court reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court ruled that the venue was not improperly laid, as it was sufficiently proven that the decedent also maintained residence in Muntinlupa, which at the time of the filing of the case was a Municipality under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Moreover, the Court held that it need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to rule that respondent has the legal capacity to file the petition. It cited the cases of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera and Quita vs. Court of Appeals. The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. However, even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, the latter still has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo with regard to the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. Thus, respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status either as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

FACTS:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.  On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Respondent filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City but petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. They claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. The siblings of Rodolfo later joined in the proceedings. The motions to dismiss were denied and reconsiderations were filed.

The trial court held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid and that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent had the capacity to file the petition for letters of administration – REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT; but Court declared that if divorce and marriage was proven, then respondent had the capacity of the wife under Article 144, but if not proven, respondent still has the capacity as co-owner of the properties in the estate under Article 148.

RULING AND DOCTRINE:

(1) Whether venue was properly laid

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that “residence,” for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.” The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between “residence” for purposes of election laws and “residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, “residence” and “domicile” are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.  However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

(2) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

The Court held that it need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to rule that respondent has the legal capacity to file the petition. It cited the cases of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera and Quita vs. Court of Appeals.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.  Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. Thus, respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

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